At first glance, the book is organized fairly well. Starting with the fall of the bank in early 1995, the first three chapters of the book give some interesting background on the Barings family and merchant bank. We also learn that at one point, the Barings family was considered to be one of the six great powers of Europe. In part two of the book, readers who are unfamiliar with exotic financial instruments received a thorough and comprehensive introduction to options, futures, and other exotic derivatives. Throughout the explanations Zhang employs vivid analogies and clever examples to get his point across. In part three of the book, Zhang makes a weak though well substantiated attempt to implicate the Japanese economy as the real culprit and devotes nearly a whole chapter to explaining the state of the Japanese economy at the time of the bankruptcy. Zhang gives us a brief history lesson of the Japanese political economy and Japanese financial markets, and a snapshot of Japanese economic and financial activity in and around the first two months of 1995.

Zhang agrees with such financial scholars as Jorion, author of Big Bets Gone Bad, that the people who wield these exotic derivative products are often more dangerous than the products themselves. Here, just as in the case of Robert L. Citron's key role in the Orange county bankruptcy and the rocket scientists at the helm of Long Term Capital Management's financial collapse, this line of reasoning may very well be true.